

# Health Symposium 19

## Swiss Society of General Internal Medicine

# Mutations du système de santé: quels acteurs ont le plus d'impact ?

22. November 2019


Céline Mavrot

Dr. Admin. Publ.

KPM Center for Public Management, University of Bern

1. The Swiss multi-level system
2. Key Players: How to promote public health initiatives?
3. Remarks on political lobbying

# 1. The Swiss multi-level system



# 1. The Swiss multi-level system

## Swiss federalism – structure:

- National level
- Cantonal level
- Intercantonal level
- Municipal level

→ **High complexity, High level of local autonomy**

## Swiss federalism – processes:

- Direct democracy → culture of consensus
- Numerous veto points (Vatter 2006)
- Threat of referendum : impact on the policy-making process (Papadopoulos 2001)

→ **Opportunities to take advantage of !**

# 1. The Swiss multi-level system

## Centralized systems:

### Advantages:

- Clarity of the system
- Focus on one decisional procedure
- Decision → homogeneous implementation

### Disadvantage:

- One-shot systems

## Federal systems:

### Disadvantages:

- Complexity of the system
- Investment on multiple decisional system
- Fragmented decisions

### Advantages:

- «Multiple venues» (Studlar 2010)

# 1. The Swiss multi-level system

## Centralized systems:

### Advantages:

- Clarity of the system
- Focus on one decisional procedure
- Decision → homogeneous implementation

### Disadvantage:

- One-shot systems

## Federal systems:

### Disadvantages:

- Complexity of the system
- Investment on multiple decisional system
- Fragmented decisions

### Advantages:

- «Multiple venues» (Studlar 2010)

## 2. Key players: the cantons and the cities

### The Swiss federalism as an «experimental lab»

- Fédéralisme d'exécution / Vollzugsföderalismus: policies adapted to local specificities (Linder 1987)
- Experimentation opportunity at the local level → pilot projects, comparative studies
  - Opens the door to innovation
  - Possibility of bottom-up pressure from the cities / cantons

# Multiple venues: The example of tobacco advertising restrictions



Source: 24 Heures, La publicité du tabac est omniprésente dans les commerces, 27.05.2014



## 2. Key players: the inter-cantonal level

### Debates in the Romandie on alcohol and tobacco advertising restrictions:

« Un commissaire évoque même que si cette limitation de publicité était mise en place, l'industrie du tabac et celle de la publicité – et les imprimeries – **pourraient perdre des places de travail et par là, pousser des personnes à l'alcoolisme du fait de la perte de leur emploi** » (Bulletin du Grand Conseil vaudois 2002 : 2701).

« (...) je crois qu'on peut être d'accord en grande partie avec la distinction que le Conseil d'État a faite précisément concernant des alcools **qui font partie de notre vie culturelle : le vin, la bière**. Je vois difficilement comment on pourrait interdire les 'fêtes de la bière', chose **qui existe depuis la nuit des temps** chez nous et ailleurs » (Bulletin du Grand Conseil fribourgeois 2003 : 588).

## 2. Key players: the inter-cantonal level

- Window of opportunity in Geneva → first bill in 2000
- Demonstration of feasibility, efficacy, legality
- Inter-cantonal transfer of the policy intervention in 14 cantons 2005-2010
  
- Conférence des directrices et directeurs cantonaux de la santé (CDS) / Konferenz der kantonalen Gesundheitsdirektorinnen und – direktoren (GDK)
- Key player in the pro-active diffusion of the policy (Mavrot 2017; Mavrot et al. 2016)

## 2. Key players: political level

### Federal level: national parliament (e.g. commissions)

- Heart of the decision-making process
  - Big decisions
  - National impact
- ...but...
- In case of failure: embargo
  - High scrutiny
  - Political polarization (Collovald & Gaiti 1990)

### Cantonal level: GDK/CDS

- Less politicized arena
  - Research of concrete solutions
  - Culture of collaboration
- ...but...
- Local impact
  - Slow processes
  - Fragmentation
  - Bottom-up push

## 2. Key players: political level

Choose the right target

<b>National</b>  Large-scope	<b>Cantonal</b>  Experimentation
<b>Executive</b>  Solutions	<b>Legislative</b>  Political game

## 2. Other key players

### Public opinion:

- Indirect but potentially powerful player
- External pressure on decision-makers
- High-salience strategy

### Administration:

- Complex access but underestimated player
- Agenda-setting power (Mavrot & Sager 2016)
- Stability, long-term allies
- Constraints: legal basis and cost-neutrality
- Low key strategies


## 2. Other key players

### Professional federation:

- Unavoidable
- Notoriety, means, network, reputation
- But internal dissents – divergent priorities
- An important part of time/resources spent in internal struggles (Lits & Koutroubas 2011)

**→ Choice of the strategy always depends on the timing, the possibilities and the context !**

## 2. Key players



# 3. Political lobbying

## Two clichés on political lobbying...

- Omnipotent power




Image: Swissinfo.ch

- Diabolic





### 3. Political lobbying

- Problem of transparency in Switzerland
- But lobbying as part of the militia system
- Politicians need information on specialized topics: experts, interest groups, NGOs, professional federations...
- Politicians still have the last word (Sager 2015; 2016)

## 3. Political lobbying

- Lobbying is 20% law, 20% politics, 20% economics, 20% diplomacy and 20% communication (Legrelle, cited in Clamen 2005)
  - Establish oneself as a valuable and reliable information source
  - Expertise is a resource to the politicians (Avner 2016)
  - Propose solutions
  - Lobbying happens earlier than the parliamentary phase

# 3. Political lobbying

## Framing strategies:

Align the request with the strategy of the target (Décaudin & Malaval 2008)

- Local interest for local politician
- General interest for the administration
- Thematic issue for a political party
- Decrease in healthcare costs of healthcare quality for the public opinion
- Confederation-cantons cost for the canton

➔ importance of the narrative !

**« Gouverner, c'est faire croire »**

Le Prince, Machiavel

# References (I)

- Avner, M. A. (2016). "Advocacy, Lobbying and Social Change", *The Jossey-Bass Handbook of Nonprofit Leadership and Management*, 4th Ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Clamen, M. (2005). *Manuel de lobbying*. Paris: Dunod.
- Décaudin, J-M.& Malaval, P. (2008). « Le lobbying: Techniques, intérêts et limites », *Décisions Marketing*, 50: 59-69.
- Linder, W. (1987). *Politische Entscheidung und Gesetzesvollzug in der Schweiz*. Bern/Stuttgart: Haupt Verlag.
- Lits M., Koutroubas, T. (2011). *Communication politique et lobbying*. Bruxelles: De Boeck.
- Mavrot Céline (2017). "Concerted Horizontal Policy Transfer: How Local Action can Drive National Compliance to International Norms". In: Magdaléna Hadjiisky, Leslie A. Pal, Christopher Walker (eds.). *Public Policy Transfer: Micro-Dynamics and Macro-Effects*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 101-124.
- Mavrot Céline, Sager Fritz (2018). "Vertical Epistemic Communities in Multilevel Governance", *Policy & Politics* 46(3): 391-407.
- Mavrot Céline, Sager Fritz, Balthasar Andreas, Wight Nora (2016). « Quand le tabac s'affiche au Parlement. Débats sur les limitations en matière de publicité de la cigarette dans les cantons romands », *Sociograph – Sociological Research Studies* 25: 281-308.

## References (II)

- Papadopoulos, Y. (2001). "How does direct democracy matter? The impact of referendum votes on politics and policy-making", *West European Politics* 24(2): 35-58,
- Sager, F. (2015). "Samstagsgespräch», Interview, *NZZ*, 16.05.2015.
- Sager, F. (2016). "Warum Bulcke, Ermotti & Co der Politik so an den Karren fahren", Interview, *Cash*, 17.08.2016.
- Studlar, D.T. (2010). "What Explains the Paradox of Tobacco Control Policy under Federalism in the U.S. and Canada? Comparative Federalism Theory versus Multi-level Governance", *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 40(3): 389-411.
- Vatter, A. (2006). "The transformation of access and veto points in swiss federalism", *Regional & Federal Studies* 15(1).